The prisoners’ issue: prudence and not maximalist hyperbole

Vahe H Apelian

Rightfully or wrongly, I associate the term of maximalism to Simon Vratsian as it pertains to Armenian politics. Maximalism in the quest of what is desirable and not what is possibly attainable.

Hyperbole is a term best expressed by its synonyms, such as exaggeration, magnification, overstatement. Often the two terms merge into what I called maximalist hyperbole for bold and definitive statements often made regarding the perceived political mishandling the sitting government ostensibly is making. Maximalist hyperbole has become endemic in the 21st century politics, whether America or Armenia. For this blog, I am alluding to the Armenian prisoners languishing in the dungeons of Baku and the Armenian government handling the issue.

Maximalist hyperbole came to my mind when I read Hrair Balian reporting on the last panel of an international conference on "Human Rights and Accountability - Pathways to Post-Conflict Justice" organized by the Center For Truth & Justice (CFTJ), that took place in Yerevan, between September 11 to 13. The last panel has dealt with "Azerbaijan and COP29". The participants, wrote Hrair,  “included Michael Rubin, Anthony Portantino, Anouch Toranian, and me.” 

Hrair has “expressed regrets that the Government of Armenia has violated all three cardinal rules by making damaging public comments about the hostages, by leaving the hostages out of their negotiations with Azerbaijan, and by giving their consent to Azerbaijan hosting COP29 summit without demanding the release of the 23 hostages in Baku. ”Hrair has rightly “called upon the international community to boycott COP29 if the 23 hostages are not released before the summit.” The panel has been moderated by Eric Hacopian. I can safely envision that Eric Hacopian reciprocated Hrair’s comments.

I cannot imagine that there is an Armenian who is not concerned for the welfare of the Armenian hostages held prisoners in Baku. We also know that Armenia is negotiating with Azerbaijan on the crossroad for peace initiative. 

An issue cannot come on the negotiation table if both parties are not willing to negotiate on the matter. We all know that Armenia is the underdog in this negotiation having, for all practical purposes capitulated in its November 9, 2020, tri-party agreement, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed.  Each and every provision on that 9 points capitulation, Armenia secured by blood. It was not out of altruism that Baku consented for an umbilical cord between Armenia and the remaining Mountainous Karabagh.  And surely, it was not out of magnanimity that Baku agreed not to have any mention of a corridor through Syunik region connecting Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan in that same capitulation that the PM Nikol Pashinyan signed on behalf of Armenia. 

Hrair notes the following: “I expanded on the top three cardinal rules for hostage negotiations that I have learned in 35 years of conflict resolution: do no harm, establish dialogue with hostage takers, and look for incentives (bargaining chips) to facilitate the release of hostages.” 

But that is precisely the very issue that the PM Nikol Pashinyan alluded to during his latest conference. He said it is against the interest of Armenia to negotiate in the context of hostage negotiations that the opposition demands the government to negotiate. In a hostage negotiation, the hostages are the issue. In fact, the hostages are the only issue. The hostages are not a tangential issue. In fact, all other issues can be tangential when negotiating with the hostage takers to have the hostages brought safely to their homes, Surely the hostage taking issue, will be central, if not the only agenda item, if Armenia succeeds bringing it on the negotiation table. 

But imagine if Armenia puts the Artsakh prisoners’ issue on the negotiation table but Azerbaijan outright refuses to entertain. That will be a serious blow to Yerevan negotiating the cross road initiative or any other initiative on behalf of Armenia. What recourse Yerevan can possibly have to put the Artsakh prisoner issue on the agenda when Baku rejects it outright? Absolutely none, as far as I can reason.  Regrettable as it is, but from the past three decades I can safely say, unlike for the crossroad for peace initiative, there will no internationally backing whatsoever of Yerevan to bring the Artsakh prisoners issue on the negotiation table with Baku, if the later refuses it. It is said that during legal proceedings, the prosecutor should not ask questions whose answer the prosecutor does not know. So is in negotiation at that level. Do not put on the agenda an issue for negotiation, the other camp, you know refuses to entertain, and you have no recourse to force the issue on the table. Yerevan either makes the prisoners or the crossroad for peace initiative the crux of its negotiations with Baku and stands by it or it does not. 

As to why Armenia consented Azerbaijan to host an international conference on climate? I have no answer. But I trust the government of Armenia and I am for continual negotiations and firmly believe that supporting or backing the democratically elected government empowers it more at the negotiation round table. That is why I advocate prudence. We are in this for a long, long haul.

The Artsakh capitulation is moot, as far as I am concerned. The terms of the capitulation the last president of Artsakh Samvel Shahramanyan signed have not been public. At least I am not aware. The only thing that is visible in plain day light is the following. The last president Samvel Shahramanyan, who signed the capitulation and the depopulation of historic Artsakh, was flown out of Artsakh in Russian helicopter to Armenia, while the presidents of Artsakh who served before him were taken hostage and are languishing in prison with a few other high placed Artsakh officials, while Shahramanian roams freely in Armenia.  Wow!